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Abstract
OBJECTIVE
This paper studies postseparation fertility behavior. The aim is to investigate whether,
and if so how, separation affects second birth spacing in Western European countries.
METHODS
This analysis makes use of rich survey data from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and the United Kingdom, as well as from Finnish register data. We thus cover
the behavior of a large proportion of the population of Western Europe. We also use
descriptive measures, such as Kaplan‒Meier survival functions and cumulative
incidence curves. In the multivariate analysis, we employ event history modeling to
show how education relates to postseparation fertility behavior.
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RESULTS
There are large differences in postseparation fertility behavior across European
countries. For Spain and Italy, we find that only a negligibly small proportion of the
population have a second child after separating from the other parent of the firstborn
child. The countries with the highest proportion of second children with a new partner
are the United Kingdom, Germany, and Finland. In all  countries, separation after first
birth leads to a sharp increase in the birth interval between first and second births.
CONTRIBUTION
Our study is a contribution to the demographic literature that aims at understanding
birth spacing patterns in Western Europe. Furthermore, we draw attention to the role of
postseparation policies in explaining country differences in fertility behavior in
contemporary societies.
1. Introduction
There is a large body of literature that examines the role of social policies in fertility
behavior in contemporary societies (e.g., Castles 2003; Gauthier 2007; McDonald 2000;
Kalwij 2010; Wood 2016). Great emphasis has been laid on the effect of childcare
services, such as the availability of places in public childcare institutions (e.g., Kravdal
1996). The role of parental leave regulations for fertility transition and birth spacing has
also been examined (e.g., Duvander, Lappegard, and Andersson 2010). In the same
vein, comparative welfare state research has highlighted the role of childcare and
parental leave in explaining country differences in total fertility. A common view in this
context is that many of the fertility differences in contemporary Europe can be
explained by country differences in family and work reconciliation policies (Castles
2003). Countries that are unable to reform their family policies and instead adhere to
the “housewife model” would experience low birth rates (Esping-Andersen 1999).
Although this literature has greatly advanced our understanding of social policies
and fertility changes, it remains incomplete to some extent. Comparative welfare state
research has largely focused on work and family reconciliation policies, while the rules
and regulations that govern postseparation behavior have not been considered with the
same degree of enthusiasm. In the demographic literature, a large body of research
exists that examines postseparation behavior. Here, however, country differences in
behavior are rarely explained by social policies. With our paper, we seek to bridge these
two strands of literature by exploring the relationship between postseparation policies
and postseparation fertility behavior.
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Our study relates to the large body of demographic literature that deals with the
fertility behavior of stepfamilies in individual countries (Beaujouan and Wiles-Portier
2011; Heintz-Martin, Le Bourdais, and Hamplová 2014; Henz 2002; Holland and
Thomson 2011; Meggiolaro and Ongaro 2010; Vikat, Thomson, and Hoem 1999) and
in a crossnational context (see, e.g., Henz and Thomson 2005; Thomson 2004; Vikat,
Thomson, and Prskawetz 2004). It is also linked to research that has investigated multi-
partnered fertility – that is, the question of whether men and women have children with
different partners across their life courses (Carlson and Furstenberg 2006; Guzzo and
Furstenberg 2007a, 2007b; Manlove et al. 2008; Scott et al. 2013; Thomson et al.2014).
Unlike  prior  studies,  our  paper  focuses  specifically  on  second birth  spacing and,  as  a
corollary, the transition to the second biological child after union disruption. We focus
on second birth behavior because having a second child is quite a regular and
predictable event. Most people in Western Europe aspire to have two children (Testa
2007). Those who have a second child tend to do so around two to four years after the
first birth. There are several reasons given in the literature for this close spacing of first
and second children. Ní Bhrolcháin (1986) argues that close spacing of births is an
efficient way of organizing the fertility career because it minimizes fertility-related
employment interruptions. Others refer to the “sibling hypothesis” to explain a rapid
progression to the second child (Griffith, Koo, and Suchindran 1985; Henz 2002).
According to this hypothesis, one of the underlying motivations in industrialized
societies for having two children is to provide a companion for the firstborn child. A
close spacing of births guarantees that the two first children can grow up and play
together during their childhood years and have a close relationship during their teenage
years and into adulthood.
Whatever the reasons for the close spacing of first and second children may be,
separation after first birth has considerable consequences for the fertility careers of
individuals. First-time mothers and fathers who experience union dissolution after a
first birth see not only a breakdown of their partnership, but also a potential disruption
of their fertility careers. The questions of how union dissolution influences second birth
spacing and how the impact varies by education and national policy context are the
main themes of this investigation. Data for our analysis comes from recent survey and
register data for Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. We thus focus on Western European countries and do not (with the exception
of eastern Germany) study fertility behavior in postsocialist countries. The reason for
this is that the particularities of fertility behavior in Central and Eastern European
countries after the demise of their socialist systems would require a separate
investigation beyond the scope of this paper.
Kreyenfeld et al.: Social policies, separation, and second birth spacing in Western Europe
1248 http://www.demographic-research.org
2. Prior research
There is extensive research on individual European countries (Beaujouan and Wiles-
Portier 2011; Heintz-Martin et al. 2014; Henz 2002; Holland and Thomson 2011;
Meggiolaro  and  Ongaro  2010;  Vikat  et  al.  1999),  as  well  as  work  done  from  a
comparative perspective (see, e.g., Henz and Thomson 2005; Thomson 2004; Vikat et
al. 2004), that has addressed the fertility behavior of stepfamilies. In this type of
research, stepfamilies are commonly defined as a family formed by a man and a woman
who live in a coresidential union with a child or with children where at least one of the
partners has children from a prior partnership. This research examines whether
individuals in stepfamilies behave differently from individuals in families that have
only shared biological children. One popular hypothesis is that the fertility of
stepfamilies is elevated because couples try to cement their (new) relationship with a
common child (Thomson 2004: 118). This union commitment explains why
stepfamilies generally have an above-average family size of three or more children
(Holland and Thomson 2011; Kreyenfeld and Martin 2011; Martin 2008). Stepfamily
research has greatly advanced our understanding of family diversity in contemporary
societies. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that it starts the observation
with the formation of a stepfamily. One consequence is that nonunion births are
commonly disregarded.
A related body of literature has approached the issue by using the individual
fertility career as a point of departure. Carlson and Furstenberg (2006) coined the term
“multi-partnered fertility” in this context to illustrate the fact that men and women may
have children with different partners across their life courses. This strand of research
has a strong motivation rooted in social policy concerns over the inability of men with
low levels of education to pay child support for children they have fathered with
different women. Empirical evidence from the United States has indeed shown a strong
negative educational gradient in multi-partnered fertility. Black men and women with
less education, as well as those who have their first children in their teenage years, are
prone to have children with different partners (Carlson and Furstenberg 2006; Guzzo
and Furstenberg 2007a, 2007b; Manlove et al. 2008; Scott et al. 2013). Evidence from
Europe on this topic remains sparse, but a comparative study for Australia, the United
States, Norway, and Sweden which addressed the likelihood of women having a second
or third child with a new parent also finds a strong and negative educational gradient in
multi-partnered fertility in the Nordic countries of Europe (Thomson et al. 2014).
Gałęzewska (2016) used data for Estonia, France, Norway, Russia, and the United
Kingdom to study the fertility transition after the dissolution of the first fertile union.
She finds some educational differences for Estonia, but no significant differences by
level of education for the other countries.
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Our study is closely linked to the above-mentioned studies, but unlike prior
research we focus more narrowly on the spacing between the first and second children.
We take a life course perspective in order to gain a better understanding of the
consequences of separation for the timing and spacing of subsequent life course events.
More specifically, we ask whether separation has affected second birth spacing across
Europe and if so how this pattern varies by education and social policy context.
3. Social policy, demographic context, and hypotheses
3.1 Social policy context
Social policy regulations may favor one family form over another by defining the
benefits and constraints involved in leaving the parental home, moving in with a
partner, getting married, or having children (Gauthier 2007). In this vein, authors of
comparative welfare state literature have emphasized the role of family policies, in
particular the availability of childcare and parental leave regulations, for family
dynamics in Europe (Castles 2003; McDonald 2000; Neyer 2003; Thévenon 2011). The
term “familialism” describes the underpinning of social policies that assign “maximum
care duties” to the family (Esping-Andersen 1999). Typical for familialistic regimes are
low maternal full-time employment rates, a gendered division of care work, and the
economic dependence of women with children on the male breadwinner.
Defamilialization describes social policies that work in the opposite direction and
enable both women and men to be employed and economically independent. Gender
equality in the labor market and a fair division of family duties – typical for a
defamilializing system – are expected to be conducive to fertility in advanced
economies. Conversely, familialistic regimes are viewed as being counterproductive for
fertility, because they overburden the family with care obligations (Esping-Andersen
1999).
Familialism also determines the family behavior after separation and divorce. In
general, union dissolution has the most consequences in familialistic welfare state
regimes, where the gender division of household chores was the most unequal before
divorce and separation (Burkhauser et al. 1991; Andreß and Bröckel 2007; Bröckel and
Andreß 2015). Because public childcare is unavailable and because women have often
been absent from the labor market for a significant amount of time, they have limited
possibilities to enter the labor market after the breakdown of a union. Countries differ,
however, in respect of whether they expect the economically weaker party to be
gainfully employed or whether he or she can rely on spousal support. These policies
buffer the negative consequences of a marital breakdown for the weaker party in a
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familialistic regime. Spousal support may, however, impose a significant economic
burden on the economically stronger party, which may inhibit his or her ability to form
a family  with  a  new partner.  It  may also  discourage  repartnering  after  divorce  for  the
person who receives the payments, because spousal support can be curbed when a new
coresidential union is formed.
In the past, most countries had divorce laws in place that provided support for the
financially weaker ex-spouse.13 However, there are large differences across Western
Europe. In addition, many countries have reformed their divorce laws recently, enabling
a swifter divorce process and reducing access to spousal support.
Germany used to be among the countries with the most generous maintenance
regulations for the “caring” ex-spouse. Divorced women (and in theory also men) were
generally not expected to be employed full-time until the youngest child reached age 16
(Lenze 2014). A reform in 2008 introduced the concept of individual responsibility.
The legal requirement to pay spousal maintenance to the caring ex-partner is limited
now until the youngest child is age 3. However, legislation is vague and spousal support
for divorcees with older children can still be granted based on individual court cases. If
no employment can be found despite intensive search, divorcees are usually granted
spousal support. Unlike in Finland (see next paragraph), divorcees do not have
immediate access to social benefits. The assumption is that the marital bond extends
beyond the breakdown of a union; in the case of need, the ex-spouse must step in and
provide support.
Finland is positioned at the other end of the spectrum, with divorce basically
considered a clean break with very limited financial obligations between former
spouses. In principle, Finnish law provides the possibility to claim maintenance after
divorce. However, such claims do not materialize because of high female employment
rates. In addition, social benefits are considered in the calculation of potential
payments, so that spousal maintenance does not come into effect. This is in stark
contrast to Germany, where spousal support extends beyond marital breakdown.
As in Finland, the guiding principle in the United Kingdom is personal
responsibility after divorce.14 The difference is, however, that social security benefits
the claimant could receive are not taken into account in determining maintenance.
Furthermore, English and Welsh divorce law has been described as very generous to the
13 Apart from spousal support, there are also differences in other postseparation regulations. All countries
considered in our investigation have some regulations in place that define child support payments for the
nonresident parent. However, countries differ in their willingness to enforce these regulations (see Table A-3
in the Appendix). Some differences also exist in respect to physical custody regulations, with Belgium being
at the forefront of shared physical custody (see Table A-4 in the Appendix). However, in the other countries
the proportion of postseparation families practicing shared physical custody is much lower. In most countries
children reside with the mother after separation.
14 In the United Kingdom, all four national regions have their own divorce laws. Since we cannot describe all
of them in detail, we concentrate on England and Wales.
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economically weaker spouse, and only modest pressure is put on the receiving ex-
spouse to find employment (Klett-Davies 2016). It is only recently that court practice
has changed, with the expectation that women who had previously not been employed
or had worked reduced hours should increase their employment after divorce.
The situation is ambivalent in France. It is the one country that still holds on to the
principle of fault-based divorce. The partner who is claimed to be guilty for the
breakdown of the marriage may be excluded from receiving spousal alimony. This
seemingly harsh and outdated regulation is, however, not very significant. Fault-based
divorce applies to only a very small proportion of all divorces. Moreover, spousal
alimony, in contrast to child alimony, is infrequent and, if granted, very low. According
to Boisson and Wisnia-Weill (2012), spousal alimony was granted in just 10% of all
divorces. As in Finland, spouses are assumed to be economically independent before
and after divorce.
A similar approach is taken by the divorce law of Belgium. It  was  only  in  2007
that fault-based divorce was abolished. Although it is possible to claim spousal
maintenance, individual responsibility is emphasized in Belgian law. As female full-
time employment rates are generally high, the expectation is that both parties will be
employed after divorce. One aspect that distinguishes Belgium from the other countries
is the residence of the children. Unlike in the other countries, children do not
necessarily live with the mother after divorce (see Table A-4 in the Appendix). Instead,
shared physical custody is very widespread. As a consequence of the more equal
division of care after divorce, divorcees cannot claim spousal support easily on the
grounds of their care obligations.
The case is very different for Spain and Italy. Here, female employment rates are
comparatively low, a strongly gendered division of work exists, and therefore the
possibilities for mothers to be economically independent are limited. Despite being
familialistic in nature, there is no functioning system of spousal support that buffers the
economic consequences of a marital breakdown for the weaker party. Divorced women
are more likely than divorced men to stay in the family home after divorce. However,
only about 12% of divorcees in Spain and 20% in Italy receive financial support from
their ex-partners (Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) 2013; ISTAT 2014). It is
consistent with the principles of a familialistic regime to ameliorate the adverse
consequences of divorce for the economically weaker party through spousal alimony
payments. As this is not the case in Italy and Spain, divorce poses a significant
economic risk for the weaker party (Ongaro, Mazzuco, and Meggiolaro 2009; Andreß
et al. 2006). Economic dependence may hinder the weaker party from leaving a union
and thus curbs the freedom to leave “potentially oppressive relationships” (Orloff 1993:
320). If people nevertheless decide to end a marriage, strict divorce laws that demand
long  separation  periods  are  an  obstacle  to  entering  a  new  partnership  and  to  having
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children with a new partner. It was only in 2015 that Italy relaxed its regulations, and
couples are now allowed to divorce after one year of separation in cases of mutual
consent.
3.2 Demographic context
In addition to the pivotal role of institutional contexts, it is also vital to acknowledge
that fertility decisions are embedded in the larger logic of the life course. The term “life
course contingency” was coined in this context to highlight the path dependency of life
course decisions (Hogan 1978). Prior life course events determine the subsequent life
course. They may open up new behavioral options or close them. For postseparation
fertility behavior, past decisions on whether to marry or cohabit can be influential for
subsequent life course outcomes, because spousal support is commonly granted to
divorcees only. The countries we consider for our investigation differ greatly in terms
of marriage behavior and nonmarital childbearing. In Finland and France, a large
proportion of births are out of wedlock. In Italy, only a smaller proportion of births are
nonmarital. In 2012, this applied to 26% of all births (compared to 42% in Finland,
57% in France, and 48% in the United Kingdom) (EUROSTAT 2015). Nonmarital
childbearing in Spain sky-rocketed to almost 40% in 2012. Germany is an interesting
intermediate case because of the stark differences in nonmarital parenthood between
eastern and western Germany: in 2012, more than 60% of all births were nonmarital in
the east, compared to 28% in the west.
In order to understand postseparation birth behavior, it is particularly important to
know about the separation and divorce patterns in a country. Unfortunately, there is a
lack of suitable and comparable official indicators. Most statistical offices generate the
crude divorce rate, but separations are not recorded in the vital registration system.
Furthermore, the number and age of children are not systematically accounted for in the
divorce statistics; if anything is recorded, it is only the number of children who are
minors. As a consequence, we have no comparable data from the vital registration
system to tell us at which point in the childbearing process separation or divorce occurs.
In the absence of comparable official data, Table 1 maps separation statistics that
are based on our own calculations (the data source is explained in more detail in Section
4). The table includes data on Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. Because of the stark differences in demographic behavior, figures for eastern
and western Germany are reported separately. The table lists the probability of being
separated from the other parent of the firstborn child. The process time is the age of the
first child. All unions are included here, regardless of whether they were marital or
nonmarital. Also people who had a child outside of any coresidential partnership are
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included (they are coded as if they separated at the birth of the child). As depicted in
this table, large differences in separation probabilities of parents exist across Western
European countries. In Finland, eastern Germany, and the United Kingdom, about 15%
of  those  men  and  women  who  had  children  were  not  in  a  union  with  the  mother  or
father any longer when the first child was born. By the time the first child reached age
10, the proportion of separated parents had increased to nearly a quarter. In western
Germany,  France,  and  Belgium,  only  a  small  proportion  of  people  have  a  first  child
outside a union. Separation probabilities increase thereafter. However, when the first
child is 10 years old, between 10% and 15% of the parents are separated. In Southern
Europe, the proportion is smaller: only 10% in Spain and 6% in Italy. From this, one
must conclude that the proportion of the population which is subject to the risk of
having a second child after separation differs greatly across countries.
Table 1: Proportion of women and men who had a first child and are
separated, by age of first child and country15
Age of first child Belgium Finland France Germany
(western)
Germany
(eastern)
Italy Spain United Kingdom
Birth of child 7% 14% 5% 8% 16% 5% 8% 16%
Age 5 10% 17% 8% 11% 20% 5% 9% 20%
Age 10 13% 23% 12% 14% 27% 6% 10% 24%
Individuals 1,844 20,488 2,054 2,134 535 7,028 1,666 13,576
Separations 268 5,313 269 309 164 426 141 3,224
Notes: The sample includes women and men who had their first child in 1990 or later. For Germany only cohorts born 1971–1973
and for Finland only cohorts born 1969–1972 were selected for this representation. The Spanish sample includes women only.
Results for Belgium, Germany, and France were weighted.
3.3 Hypotheses
The following investigation explores how separation shapes second birth behavior in
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. We treat eastern and
western Germany separately because of the large differences in marriage behavior,
women’s work patterns, and separation probabilities of one-child parents.
The most important reason why we expect to find country differences in the
prevalence of second births in new unions is the country differences in separation
behavior. For Italy and Spain, we expect to observe a small proportion of second
children in new unions. People do not enter the risk set of having a child with a new
partner because they rarely dissolve a union. By this logic, France, Belgium, and
15 Table A-2 in the Appendix complements this table by providing estimates of the competing risk of
separation and having a second child. It supports the perspective of Table 1 in that many couples in the
United Kingdom, Finland, and eastern Germany separate before having a second child.
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western Germany hold an intermediate position, while the United Kingdom, Finland,
and eastern Germany are extreme cases, with high proportions of people at risk of
having a child in a new union.
Beyond these demographics, social policies have an impact on postseparation
behavior. They may do so by inhibiting divorce, as is the case in Italy and Spain. They
may also affect repartnering, as is the case in Germany and England and Wales, where
the weaker partner loses spousal support when they enter a new coresidential union,
while the stronger party is burdened with economic payments to the ex-partner.
Countries such as Finland, Belgium, and France, which support women’s (and men’s)
economic independence, generally offer a clear break after divorce that facilitates
entrance into a new partnership and the transition to a new child in a new union.
Apart from the country differences, we also examine differences by level of
education. Here we test whether the findings for the United States can be transferred to
European  countries.  For  the  United  States,  a  strong  negative  educational  gradient  in
multi-partnered fertility has been reported in various studies. This has raised a social
policy concern, in particular because poorly educated men were often unable to pay
alimony after separation and divorce. Unfortunately, this part of the investigation must
be limited to Finland, western Germany, and the United Kingdom, because the sample
size for the other countries is too small for an in-depth analysis by educational level.
4. Data and method
To answer our research questions, we use recent survey data for Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (see Table A-1 in the Appendix for an
overview). For Finland, we use data drawn from national population registers. The
analyses were conducted separately for each country by the respective national
representatives. However, we have tried to harmonize the analyses as much as possible
by providing a data manual that describes in detail how union and fertility histories
were cleaned and how missing information was imputed in the different national data
sets  (see  core  code  in  the  Online  Appendix).  Due  to  the  different  sources  of  data
available to us, some country particularities persisted. For example, the Spanish sample
includes female respondents only.
Our sample is limited to respondents who have at least one biological child.
Respondents with multiple births were deleted from the sample. Because our interest is
in more recent behavior, we limited the investigation to men and women who had their
first  children  after  1990.  For  Germany  and  Finland,  where  the  data  follows  a  cohort
design, we have restricted the analysis to women and men born around 1970 (1969–
1973 for Finland and 1971–1973 for Germany). Our key interest is in the birth spacing
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between first and second births and whether a person has a second child in a new union.
For Germany and Finland, it is possible to link children and unions and to clearly
identify whether a second child is from a new parent who is not the father or mother of
the  firstborn  child.  As  this  information  is  not  available  from  the  other  data  sources,
however, we decided to harmonize the procedure for all countries. We follow a strategy
that is commonly applied in stepfamily research (Holland and Thomson 2011).
Accordingly,  we assume that  the  second child  is  with  a  new partner  if  the  woman or
man experienced a separation or divorce between the births of the first and second
children or entered a new coresidential union during this time. Some couples may have
children outside of any union and only subsequently form a joint household. Our
strategy would erroneously classify the second children as births with a new partner. To
reduce this potential misclassification, we assume that a person who moved in with a
partner within six months of the first birth had already been living with that particular
partner  at  first  birth.  Some  women  and  men  may  have  first  and  second  children  as
single  parents.  Others  may  be  single  at  first  birth  and  have  the  second  child  in  a
coresidential union. In these cases we assume that the children are from different
partners.
As a first step, an extensive descriptive analysis presents easily accessible
measures which depict the interrelation of separation and second birth spacing patterns.
We calculate the mean differences between first and second births and distinguish the
cases by whether the second child is in an ongoing union or not. Furthermore, we
employ cumulative incidence curves (Gooley et al. 1999) to estimate the probabilities
of having a second child in an ongoing union versus the probabilities of having a child
in a new union. The multivariate analysis consists of an event history model that studies
the  determinants  of  second  birth  progressions.  The  key  independent  variable  is  the
union status. We distinguish episodes in “ongoing unions,” in the status of being
“single,” and episodes in “new unions.” People who are still partnered with the same
person as when the first child was born are classified as ongoing unions. People who no
longer live with the same person as when the first child was born are assumed to be in a
new  union.  The  process  time  in  our  model  is  the  age  of  the  first  child  modeled  as  a
piecewise-constant function. We also control for the parent’s age at first birth
(categorized) and sex. Furthermore, we include a categorical variable for highest level
of education achieved up to the date of the interview. We distinguish low education
(ISCED97 1–2), medium education (ISCED97 3–4), and high education (ISCED97 5–
6). Table 2 provides the number of occurrences and exposures for the different
countries and the respective variables. Note the low exposure population in a new union
for Italy and Spain.
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Table 2: Occurrences (occ.) and exposures (% exp.) for the multivariate
model (see Table 3)
Belgium France Germany Germany
(western) (eastern)
Occ. % exp. Occ. % exp. Occ. % exp. Occ. % exp.
Age of first child
Age 0–1 386 39 284 46 492 41 80 32
Age 2–3 540 21 759 26 1,005 24 165 23
Age 4–5 143 12 245 12 345 13 100 15
Age 6–7 38 8 82 7 115 8 58 11
Age 8–9 23 6 27 4 52 5 30 7
Age 10 and older 9 13 5 5 53 8 17 12
Respondents’ age at first birth
Age 15–21 95 7 143 9 451 23 136 29
Age 22–23 114 10 151 10 272 13 60 14
Age 24–25 160 13 244 15 306 14 70 16
Age 26–29 445 34 516 34 558 27 109 26
Age 30–34 269 24 275 22 400 18 67 13
Age 35 and older 66 12 73 10 75 5 8 2
Education
Low 221 22 252 18 339 16 36 6
Medium 364 40 659 51 1,118 58 278 71
High 564 38 491 31 605 26 136 22
Union status
Single 51 11 61 10 79 12 34 20
Ongoing union 1,030 83 1,248 85 1,750 77 317 67
New union 68 7 93 5 233 11 99 14
Gender
Male 525 44 611 47 736 37 178 38
Female 624 56 791 53 1326 63 272 62
Total 1,149 100 1,402 100 2,062 100 450 100
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Table 2: (Continued)
Finland Italy United Kingdom Spain
Occ. % exp. Occ. % exp. Occ. % exp. Occ. % exp.
Age of first child
Age 0–1 5,050 42 701 36 2,541 40 166 38
Age 2–3 6,969 22 1,682 25 3,931 23 347 26
Age 4–5 1,878 12 1,001 14 1,319 12 212 15
Age 6–7 731 8 354 9 498 8 92 9
Age 8–9 365 6 179 6 200 6 29 6
Age 10 and older 415 9 112 10 165 11 21 6
Age at first birth
Age 15–21 2,259 18 319 8 1,839 20 135 14
Age 22–23 1,871 12 341 8 916 9 105 10
Age 24–25 2,336 14 473 11 1,076 11 123 13
Age 26–29 4,945 31 1,391 32 2,250 24 290 31
Age 30–34 3,537 21 1,211 32 1,888 23 192 24
Age 35 and older 460 4 294 10 685 14 22 7
Education
Low 2,177 19 1,679 42 1,585 19 288 33
Medium 6,100 42 1,822 46 3,727 45 202 27
High 7,131 39 528 12 3,342 36 289 30
Union status
Single 973 20 40 4 729 19 23 6
Ongoing union 12,156 66 3,897 94 7,078 73 796 89
New union 2,279 14 92 2 847 9 48 5
Gender
Male 7,117 45 1,871 45 3,361 40 – –
Female 8,291 55 2,158 55 5,293 60 867 100
Total 15,408 100 4,029 100 8,654 100 867 100
5. Results
5.1 Separation and birth spacing
Table 3 displays the mean difference between first and second births by whether the
second child is with a new parent or not. For individuals who stay partnered with the
parent of the first child, it is about three years. There is some country variation, with
Finland and Belgium displaying very narrow birth intervals of less than three years on
average. For the other countries, mean differences between the first two births are
around  or  a  bit  higher  than  three  years.  Italy  and  eastern  Germany  are  notable
exceptions in this comparison, with a mean age difference between first and second
children of more than four years. For all countries, separation leads to increased birth
intervals; compared to people in ongoing unions, the duration between first and second
children is about one and a half times to twice as long. People who had either the first
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or the second child as a single person hold an intermediate position. They space their
births wider apart than couples who remain partnered to the parent of the firstborn
child. However, on average they space their births closer than people who have a
second child in a new union.
Table 3: Mean difference between first and second children in years (standard
error in parenthesis), only women and men who had at least two
children at interview
First and second children in
same union
First and second children
in different unions
All Single births New union All
Belgium 2.78
(0.05)
3.55
(0.42)
6.90
(0.41)
5.46
(0.33)
Finland 2.84
(0.02)
4.18
(0.11)
5.17
(0.07)
4.88
(0.06)
France 3.18
(0.45)
3.93
(0.38)
5.49
(0.27)
4.98
(0.23)
Germany (western) 3.27
(0.05)
4.46
(0.50)
6.60
(0.42)
6.07
(0.35)
Germany (eastern) 4.07
(0.19)
4.80
(0.56)
6.43
(0.48)
6.19
(0.38)
Italy 4.08
(0.04)
4.19
(0.53)
6.43
(0.41)
5.80
(0.35)
Spain 3.87
(0.09)
3.38
(0.43)
5.44
(0.41)
4.84
(0.34)
United Kingdom 2.99
(0.02)
3.88
(0.11)
5.59
(0.12)
4.88
(0.09)
Notes: The sample includes women and men who had their first child in 1990 or later. For Germany only cohorts born 1971–1973
and for Finland only cohorts born 1969–1972 were selected for this representation. The Spanish sample includes women only.
Results for Belgium, Germany, and France were weighted.
These simple descriptive statistics as presented in Table 3 are calculated for
respondents who had at least two children, and they do not account for possible
censoring. Because our focus of analysis is on recent birth behavior, this aspect is of
utmost concern, as many of the more recent cohorts may separate or have a second
child after the time of interview. A more appropriate method that takes censoring into
account makes use of the cumulative incidence curves as displayed in Figure 1. These
give the probability of having a second child depending on whether the second child is
in an ongoing union or not. Note that single births are grouped under “new union” here.
Figure 1 reveals large differences in the likelihood that second children are in a
new union. In Finland, a large proportion of second children are born in a new union.
Among the people who have a second child, almost 20% had this second child in a new
union ten years after the first birth. In Germany and the United Kingdom, the likelihood
of having a second child in a new union is lower. But even in these countries a
substantial proportion of the population have their first two children in different unions
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(assumed to be with different partners). For Germany, behavior in the eastern and
western parts of the country differs greatly. Multi-partnered fertility is much more
common in eastern than in western Germany. For Belgium and France, despite a high
progression rate to the second child in general, the likelihood of having a second child
with a new partner is low. Apparently, couples usually have a second child before
separation. Spain and Italy stand apart from the rest of Europe. In these two Southern
European countries, the likelihood of having a second child is lower than elsewhere,
and the likelihood of having a second child in a new union is negligible.
Figure 1: Cumulative incidence functions, outcome variables:
1) second child in ongoing union, 2) second child in new union
(including single births)
Belgium France
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Figure 1: (Continued)
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Finland United Kingdom
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Figure 1: (Continued)
Italy Spain
Notes: The sample includes women and men who had their first child in 1990 or later. For Germany only cohorts born 1971–1973
and for Finland only cohorts born 1969–1972 were selected for this representation. The Spanish sample includes women only.
Results for Belgium, Germany, and France were weighted.
5.2 Multivariate results
The descriptive analysis has revealed large differences in the probability of having a
second child in a new union across Europe. However, we have not yet accounted for the
different chances of entering a new union. In the next step, we investigate the rate of
having  a  second  child  by  union  status.  In  order  to  address  this  issue,  we  employ  a
multivariate analysis by estimating an event history model. The event of interest is
second birth. The main process time is the duration since last birth. The baseline
intensity is modeled with a piecewise constant specification. Together with standard
control variables, such as education, sex, age at first birth, and child’s age, we account
for the union status.
The results are presented in Table 4. The control variables follow an expected
pattern. We find that second birth rates decline with increasing age at first birth.
Furthermore, for most of the countries we find that high education increases second
birth rates, which is compatible with prior findings on second birth fertility in Western
European countries (e.g., Kravdal 2001). The key variable in our model is the union
status. In most countries, we do not find significant or large differences between
individuals in ongoing and new unions. This also holds for Spain and Italy. In the
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descriptive statistics, we have shown that second births in a new union are rather
uncommon in Spain and Italy. Based on the multivariate analysis, we may conclude that
the low prevalence of postseparation fertility in these countries is not due to the low risk
of having a second child in a new union, but rather to the low chances of entering a new
union after first birth. Once people enter a new union, second birth rates are comparable
to those of couples in ongoing unions, even in these countries. In Finland, hazard rates
for couples in new unions and in ongoing unions are almost the same. The case that
stands apart from the rest is eastern Germany. Here we find significantly elevated
second birth risks in a new union. For people in a new union, second birth risks increase
by 47% compared to people in an ongoing union. This result mirrors those of prior
studies, showing a high degree of family diversity in eastern Germany (Kreyenfeld,
Konietzka, and Heintz-Martin 2016). Although Germany is a familialistic regime,
eastern Germans behave more like Finns, for whom separation and divorce are not a
great hindrance to entering a new partnership and having a child with a new partner.
Table 4: Results from piecewise constant event history model: Relative risks
of second birth
Belgium France Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany
Finland United
Kingdom
Italy Spain
Age at first birth
Age 15–21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Age 22–23 0.78 0.94 1.00 0.91 0.96** 0.90*** 0.98 1.04
Age 24–25 0.78* 0.95 1.03 0.92 0.94*** 0.85*** 0.99 1.03
Age 26–29 0.76** 0.83* 0.91 0.80 0.88*** 0.82*** 0.96 0.94
Age 30–34 0.62*** 0.68*** 0.90 0.83 0.76*** 0.72*** 0.81*** 0.80*
Age 35 and older 0.31*** 0.39*** 0.63*** 0.65 0.56*** 0.44*** 0.58*** 0.32***
Education
Low 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Medium 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.67** 1.10*** 0.92*** 1.04 0.91
High 1.47*** 1.17 1.10 1.05 1.28*** 1.05 1.23*** 1.21**
Union status
Ongoing union 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Single 0.42*** 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.35*** 0.30*** 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.36***
New union 1.10 1.08 0.95 1.46*** 0.97** 1.02 1.07 0.96
Notes: Further control variables in model are age of first child and gender. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.
5.3 Transition to second births in new unions (results from interaction models)
In the last step of our analysis, we investigate socioeconomic differences in the risks of
having a second child in a new union. For this purpose we conducted an interaction of
union status with level of education. These interaction models are restricted to western
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Germany, the United Kingdom, and Finland, as only these countries provide the sample
size for a refined analysis. We focus particularly on educational differences in the
progression to a second child. This focus is motivated by prior studies showing large
differences in multi-partnered fertility by education, in particular for the United States
(Carlson and Furstenberg 2006; Guzzo and Furstenberg 2007a, 2007b; Manlove et al.
2008; Scott et al. 2013; Thomson et al. 2014).
Table 5 displays the results from interaction models. The models were
standardized for low education, in order to be able to gauge the educational gradient by
union type. The table shows that the risk of having a second child in an ongoing union
is positive for all countries. There is a negative educational gradient for single births in
the  United  Kingdom and western  Germany,  but  not  in  Finland.  We also  find  country
differences for the risk of having a second child in a new union. While we find a
positive gradient in the case of Finland, there is a negative gradient in western Germany
and no educational differences in the United Kingdom. Based on this evidence, we may
conclude that the strong educational differences in multi-partnered fertility previously
found in the United States do not easily transfer to European countries. At least in the
case  of  second  birth  fertility,  we  do  not  find  a  consistent  and  strong  negative
educational gradient in the risk of having another child with a new partner.
Table 5: Results from piecewise constant event history model. Interaction of
union status and education, standardized for low education. Relative
risks of second birth
Low Medium High
Western Germany
Single 1 0.92 0.50***
Ongoing union 1 0.97 1.18
New union 1 0.63** 0.79
United Kingdom
Single 1 0.74** 0.60***
Ongoing union 1 0.94 1.10
New union 1 0.97 0.93
Finland
Single 1 0.85*** 1.00
Ongoing union 1 1.17** 1.37***
New union 1 1.02 1.14***
Notes: Further control variables in model are age of first child, age at first birth, gender. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.
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6. Discussion and limitations
The aim of this paper was to contribute to the growing literature on multi-partnered
fertility. While multi-partnered fertility in the United States has been explored
extensively, less is known about the determinants of having children with different
partners in Europe. Based on recent survey and register data for Western Europe, we
examined progressions to the second child. Our guiding hypothesis was that familialism
would result into low postseparation fertility. We indeed find that countries differ
radically in the prevalence of postseparation births. However, patterns cannot always be
explained  by  policy  contexts.  A  substantial  proportion  of  second  births  are  in  new
unions in Germany and the United Kingdom, despite these countries having
familialistic regimes. Belgium and France hold only an intermediate position, although
they are widely regarded as conducive to the compatibility of work and family and
emphasize economic independence before and after divorce. The reason for the
relatively  low  prevalence  of  postseparation  births  in  France  and  Belgium  is  that  first
and second births are closely spaced so that separation often occurs after the second
child is born. In Southern Europe only a negligible proportion of the population have a
second child with a new partner. The reason for the low likelihood of having a second
child  with  a  new partner  in  Italy  and Spain  is  the  low risk  of  dissolving  a  union and
entering a new union. Conditional on entering a new union, the patterns for Italy and
Spain are similar to those of other countries. This suggests that the low second birth
fertility in Southern Europe may be explained by the social and normative barriers that
hinder couples from dissolving unsatisfactory unions and entering new partnerships.
For demographic research, our results highlight the importance of union
dissolution for fertility behavior. Prior studies have already illuminated the fact that
separation and divorce are important to understand differences in national fertility rates.
Our paper has more narrowly focused on the spacing of second births. Separation and
divorce are not only relevant for understanding differences in higher-order births or
total fertility; we have also shown that second birth spacing is greatly affected by
separation and divorce, albeit to different degrees in the different countries that we have
considered in our investigation.
In contrast to previous research from the United States, we find no consistent
negative educational gradient in multi-partnered fertility. One reason may be that we
focused on transition rates to the second child, whereas prior analysis often looked into
total fertility (Beaujouan and Solaz 2013; Carlson and Furstenberg 2006) or analyzed
fertility progressions to the next child in a competing risk framework (Thomson et al.
2014). Furthermore, differences may also stem from the different treatment of births in
singlehood and births in unions. In our multivariate analysis, we separated births to
single individuals from those to individuals in a new union. For the latter population,
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we find elevated second birth rates for those with less education. Another reason may
be that many previous studies focus on the United States. The results from this country
may simply not be transferable to the European context.
While the strength of this paper is that it highlights the fact that postseparation
policies are of growing importance to understanding family behavior, we must
acknowledge that our paper is only a modest step toward a comprehensive
understanding of the relationship between social policies, partnership, and fertility
behavior after divorce and separation. We have discussed regulations on spousal
support in some detail, but many other policies, such as child alimony or child custody,
were not addressed in great detail. An important difficulty was also that regulations
concerning spousal and child maintenance are only loosely regulated by law and are
often defined in individual court cases. In addition, countries differ in how they enforce
payments. Most countries have established systems to document childcare policies and
parental leave regulations, but comprehensive statistics to document child or spousal
support are missing in most countries, let alone comparable statistics at the EU level.
Another great limitation of this paper was the data. We used the more recent large-
scale family surveys for our investigation. However, we had to make very simplistic
assumptions for our investigation to identify multi-partnered fertility, because most of
the survey data sets did not provide sufficient information to link children to
partnerships. As in previous studies, we assumed here that children are from different
partners if the respondent had seen a disruption of the union between first and second
births, or was single at first birth and did not move in with a partner within six months
of childbirth. This procedure might have greatly overestimated the share of births with a
new partner, because living-apart-together arrangements may have been erroneously
classified as new partnerships. Conversely, we have dropped unions from our
investigation where respondents could not remember the start or end dates of their
nonmarital unions or marriages (see code in the online Appendix). These people may be
particularly prone to have children with different partners (Kreyenfeld and Bastin
2015), so we may have also underestimated the extent of multi-partnered fertility.
Beyond these obstacles to generating reliable family indicators, small sample sizes
kept us from more detailed investigations by population subgroups. Most importantly,
we were unable to examine gender differences due to small sample sizes. Prior studies
have shown that social policies define the economic well-being of individuals after
divorce and separation. The economic consequences of divorce and separation are
commonly more severe in familialistic welfare states than in more defamilializing
systems, and, most importantly, vary by gender. How the economic conditions that
women and men are exposed to in the different countries of Europe vary, and how that
affects their partnership and fertility behavior after separation, must be left to future
research.
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Table A-2: Separation and second birth as competing events, results from
cumulative incidence curves
Belgium Finland France Germany (western)
2nd birth Separation 2nd birth Separation 2nd birth Separation 2nd birth Separation
Age of first child 0% 7% 0% 14% 0% 5% 0% 9%
Age 0 61% 10% 60% 20% 60% 9% 58% 12%
Age 5 68% 12% 86% 21% 73% 10% 70% 13%
Age 10 1,844 1,844 20,488 20,488 2,054 2,054 2,353 2,353
Individuals 1,070 213 12,891 4,262 1,844 1,844 1,398 274
Events 1,070 213 12,891 4,262 1,844 1,844 1,398 274
Germany (eastern) Italy Spain United Kingdom
2nd birth Separation 2nd birth Separation 2nd birth Separation 2nd birth Separation
Age of first child 0% 16% 0% 5% 0% 8% 0% 16%
Age 0 36% 24% 48% 6% 46% 9% 53% 21%
Age 5 51% 27% 67% 6% 66% 9% 61% 22%
Age 10 535 535 7,028 7,028 1,666 1,666 13,576 13,576
Individuals 254 142 3,876 413 804 138 7,140 2,886
Events 254 142 3,876 413 804 138 7,140 2,886
Notes: The sample includes women and men who had their first child in 1990 or later. For Germany only cohorts born 1971–1973
and for Finland only cohorts born 1969–1972 were selected for this representation. The Spanish sample includes women only.
Results for Belgium, Germany, and France were weighted.
Table A-3: Postseparation regulations on child maintenance, 2000
Belgium Finland France Germany Italy Spain United
Kingdom
Average child maintenance payment per child
(mean), US$ PPP 219.70 139.50 152.40 183.60 n.a. n.a. 244.80
Child maintenance as % of total income transfers 38.1 29.7 40.1 37.2 n.a. n.a. 40.0
Percentage of lone parents receiving child
maintenance 49.1 72.7 46.3 30.1 25.2 12.4 21.9
Source: OECD Family Database, table PF1.5.B and table PF1.5.C (estimations based on Luxembourg Income Study).
http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm.
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Table A-4: Postseparation regulations and practice on custody and shared
residence
Source: INE (2013); ISTAT (2014); Kindler and Walper (2016); National Institute for Health and Welfare (2016).
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